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I contrast in this paper the account I favor for how fictions can convey knowledge with 
Green’s views on the topic. On my account, fictions can convey knowledge because fictional 
works make assertions and other acts such as conjectures, suppositions, or acts of putting 
forward contents for our consideration; and the mechanism through which they do it is that of 
speech act indirection, of which conversational implicatures are a particular case. There are 
two potential points of disagreement with Green in this proposal. First, it requires that 
assertions can be made indirectly. Second, it requires that verbal fiction-making doesn’t 
consist merely in “acts of speech”, but in sui generis speech acts.  





I share many views on assertion and speech acts in general with Mitch Green. The details 
of our views differ, as it is bound to happen in philosophy. While Green offers a sophisticated 
expressive account, I defend instead what I regard an at least complex (if not sophisticated) 
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version of a normative, constitutive norms view. Sophistication makes for convergence. Thus, 
Green’s (2007, 2009) reliance on norms through his appeal to a “Handicap Principle” greatly 
improves in my view on Gricean expressive non-normative accounts like Bach’s & Harnish’s 
(1979), as on Davis’s (2003) bare intentionalism. Asserting p is according to Green (roughly) 
expressing that one believes p by deploying a device designed (by natural or social selection) 
for that purpose. When one is sincere, this affords knowledge that one does believe p, insofar 
as one subjects oneself thereby to a specific norm that would make insincerity costly. The 
norm in question is not far from the one I myself promote for core assertions (García-
Carpintero 2004, 2018, forthcoming). In turn, I argue that it is not enough to analyse assertion 
in terms of constitutive norms. An account must also be given for why such constitutive 
norms have come to be enforced; such explanation would in my view mention aspects of 
design and expression very close to what Green (2007, 2009) calls showing.  
The differences between our views thus concern what in the respective accounts is taken to 
be essential, or constitutive of the acts – whether something fundamentally psychological in 
nature or something fundamentally normative instead. Such issues however, although of 
course important for philosophical theorizing itself, are rather subtle, difficult to adjudicate if 
at all decidable, and as a result one is in my view entitled to adopt about them a Yablonian 
“quizzicalist” (fictionalist) attitude, declining going into them beyond the articulation of one’s 
own story in as clear as possible a way, in contrast to the alternatives. 
This contribution is about how we can learn from fictions, on the assumption that I also 
share with Green (and others like Friend 2008, 2014, Ichino & Currie 2017, Reicher 2012, or 
Stock 2017a) that we do. When it comes to this more specific topic, I have also promoted 
views very close to many of those that Green has been defending over the years. In particular, 
I (García-Carpintero 2016) support Literary Cognitivism (LC) in the way Green (2017a, 48) 
defines it: “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its 
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being fictional”. I think Green (2010, 2016, 2017a) has provided a good account for some 
cases (see below, §4). We also agree that literary fictions are sources of knowledge in more 
straightforward ways, as in the following two examples – even though, against what he 
contends, for reasons given below (§4) these examples in my view also support LC: 
(1) New Providence, the island containing Nassau, the capital of the Bahamas, is a drab 
sandy slab of land fringed with some of the most beautiful beaches in the world. (I. 
Fleming, Thunderball, 1963, London, Pan Books, 116; quoted in Friend 2008, 159). 
(2) Nonhuman animals have gone to court before. Arguably, the first ALF action in the 
United States was the release of two dolphins in 1977 from the University of Hawaii. 
The men responsible were charged with grand theft. (K. J. Fowler, We Are All 
Completely Beside Ourselves, 305; quoted in Stock 2017a, 24). 
I will focus on disagreements in this piece, though. I will contrast the account I favor for 
how fictions can convey knowledge, which with small variations applies both to cases such as 
(1) and (2), and the cases that Green provides in support of LC. On my account, fictional 
works make assertions and other acts in what Green (2017b) calls the assertive family, such as 
conjectures, suppositions, or acts of putting forward contents for our consideration; and the 
mechanism through which they do it is that of speech act indirection, of which conversational 
implicatures are a particular case.  
There are two main points of disagreement with Green in this, if I understand his views 
correctly. First, it requires that assertions can be made indirectly, which Green (2007, 2015) 
questions on account of the distinction between lying and misleading. Second, it requires that 
verbal fiction-making doesn’t consist merely in “acts of speech” that don’t constitute 
illocutionary acts in Austin’s (1962) terms but in specific speech acts – against what Green 
(2015) appears to suggests. Acts of speech are acts such as clearing up one’s throat by uttering 
words, or rehearsing a speech, or otherwise pretending to use language without really making 
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speech acts, perlocutionary acts such as convincing or frightening people as such, or 
Austinian misfires – an order given without the required authority, a promise not accepted. 
Smaller disagreements include my rejection of the Austinian appeal to the performative 
formula that Green (2015) favors as criterion for illocutionary types, and the already indicated 
issue about the support lent to LC by (1) and (2).  
Here is how I will proceed. In §2 I’ll sum up my reply to Green’s argument for the view 
that assertion must be explicit. §3 argues that fiction-making is a sui generis speech act, not 
an act of speech. §4 explains assertoric acts in fictions as cases of indirection.  
 
 
2. Indirect Assertion: Lying and Misleading  
 
In this section I will summarize the reasons I have given elsewhere (García-Carpintero 
2018) in reply to Green’s argument (2007, 2015) against indirect assertion based on the need 
to capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading. The argument assumes that 
insincerely asserting suffices for lying. In reply, while agreeing with Green (against Mahon 
(2016), for one) that lying requires asserting, I’ll suggest that what suffices for lying is not 
insincerely asserting, but rather insincerely asserting in an explicit way. This makes the view 
that one can make indirect assertions compatible with the lying/misleading distinction: in 
making an insincere indirect assertion, one doesn’t lie but merely misleads. 
Green (2015, 22-3; see also Green 2007, 102-3) articulates the argument thus: 
While indirect communication is ubiquitous, indirect speech acts are less common 
than might first appear. Consider an example of a type often used to illustrate 
indirect speech acts. A asks B, ‘Can you come to dinner with us tonight?’, and B 
replies, ‘I have to study.’ B makes it clear that she is too busy to join A for dinner. 
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However, must we conclude that she has done this by illocuting, for instance 
stating that she is too busy to join A for dinner? This seems unlikely. After all, if 
B did not think that her studying would prevent her from joining A for dinner, she 
would be misleading in saying what she does, but not a liar; yet if in answering as 
she has, she is asserting that she is unable to join A for dinner, she would be lying 
if she took her study plans not to interfere with dinner plans. 
In a nutshell, Green’s argument goes like this: intuitively, those indirectly conveying 
putative assertions of contents they know to be false are not lying, but merely misleading their 
audiences; hence they cannot be asserting, because asserting what one believes to be false 
suffices for lying. If S implicates p, while S doesn’t believe p, S misleads but doesn’t lie about 
p. Hence, S doesn’t assert p, for otherwise S would be lying. 
The text quoted only says that indirect communication “is less common” than assumed; 
Green (2017b, 7, 10), while still claiming on the basis of the lying/misleading distinction that 
“conversational implicature is not a species of assertion”, allows that “some, albeit unusual 
cases of indirect assertions are possible”. In personal communication, he tells me he had in 
mind here cases like putting 2 and 2 together. X and Y are detectives trying to solve a crime. 
X tells Y that it was either Jones or Smith. After a few moments of evidence-gathering and 
calculation, X also asserts that it was not Jones. On Green’s views, X is thereby assertorically 
committed to the conclusion that Smith is the culprit, but not all entailments of things one 
asserts to which one is assertorically committed are thereby assertions (Green 1999, 89). But 
in this example it does seem that X is (indirectly) asserting that Jones is the culprit, and Green 
wants to allow for it as possible exceptions.1  
I don’t think that the admission that cases of indirect assertions like this are possible is 
really consistent with the claim that assertions cannot be implicated, for I take the assertion 
here to be a conversational implicature. It is one analogous to an example from Davis (1998, 
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6), in which what is said entails the implicated content: a taxpayer answers the auditors 
question ‘Is it true that you or your spouse is 65 or older or blind?’ by saying, ‘I am 67.’, 
thereby logically but also conversationally implicating that either he or his spouse is 65 or 
over or blind.2 Examples (1)-(2) above are in fact extreme cases of this, in which the 
implicated assertion is the very same one conventionally put forward by the sentence. 
In any case, the problem with Green’s argument lies in the assumption that asserting what 
one believes to be false suffices for lying. The condition that has been traditionally taken as 
necessary for lying regarding p to account for the distinction between lying and misleading is 
not (plainly) asserting p but rather stating or saying it, in a very specific, technical sense: 
something like putting forward a sentence whose literal and direct use would be to assert p, 
whether or not one does assert it – cf. Chisholm & Feehan (1977, 150-1), Mahon (2016, 4).  
Mahon in fact rejects the necessity of an assertion condition for lying. I do not agree with 
him on this (García-Carpintero 2018). My proposal is rather this. The distinction between 
lying and misleading as regards to p does not consist in that only the former involves asserting 
p. Assertions, like other speech acts, are made in different ways: they can be implicit, indirect, 
merely hinted or insinuated (Searle 1979, ix); or they can be as explicit as possible, direct and 
literal: what is meant is then as close as possible to the semantic content of the sentence by 
means of which they are made. The intuitive distinction between lying and misleading tracks 
this equally intuitive distinction between the implicit, hinted or insinuated, and the explicit, 
direct or literal. The distinction is hence compatible with the possibility of indirect assertions.3  
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3. Fiction-Making as a Sui Generis Speech Act 
 
Why should we count the putative assertions allegedly made in examples (1)-(2) above as 
indirect, if the content asserted is the same one literally conveyed by the sentence? This is, in 
outline, the answer to be developed: (i) The utterances occur as part of a discourse that, as a 
whole, is put forward as a fiction. (ii) Fictions result from a specific speech act, fiction-
making. (iii) The assertion is indirectly conveyed on the basis of the fiction-making act. I will 
elaborate on (iii) in the next section; in this section I offer my reasons to think of fiction-
making as a specific speech act, and I discuss whether it is itself an indirect speech act when 
made by means of utterances of sentences in the declarative or other moods.  
 Currie (1990, 15) follows Searle (1974-5, 60) in taking utterances produced in fiction-
making to be literal. If one means by this that the fiction-making act actually made precisely 
fits what is semantically codified in the sentence uttered,4 I do not think this is correct. With 
most contemporary semanticists, I take it that some force-indications (at least, those 
distinguishing declaratives, interrogatives and directives) are semantically conveyed.5 But I 
do not think fiction-making fits that semantic contribution of the declarative mood: I would 
only count assertions and related acts in Green’s (2017b) assertive family (guesses, 
conjectures, suppositions) as literally made with declarative sentences. Should we hence 
count fiction-making, when done with sentences, as already an indirect speech act itself? That 
is not so straightforward, as I’ll presently explain. But I need to discuss before the second 
main potential disagreements between me and Green announced at the start. I will thereby 
elaborate on my reasons to take fictions to result from a speech act, fiction-making. 
Although, like me, Green agrees with Currie and Walton that “a fiction is an artifact 
comprising series of sentences whose contents are presented as to be imagined” (2017a, 48), 
like Walton he doesn’t appear to take fiction-making to be a specific, sui generis speech act 
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on account of this.6 In presenting us with series of sentences for us to imagine their contents, 
he appears to suggest that the fiction-maker just performs an “act of speech”, rather than a 
speech act proper.7 My reason to think so is that he offers as an illustration of his account of 
how fictions can provide knowledge an utterance that, he says, “is not an assertion or any 
other illocutionary act” (ibid., 54). He, however, (2017a, 54-5; 2017c, 1601-2) also mentions 
suppositions as offering another model, so perhaps he does think that fictions result from 
speech acts, albeit not sui generis ones. In what follows, I sum up my reasons for the specific 
speech act view and against any of these two suggestions. 
There is a clear intuitive distinction between acts of speech in general and speech acts 
proper, in the sense that Austin (1962) was after – illocutionary acts, in his terms. But there is 
considerable controversy about how to properly delimit the latter. Green (2015, 2017b) adopts 
Austin’s own criterion, namely, that the act can be performed by means of performative 
sentences. But I don’t think we should go this path. In adopting this characterization, Austin 
appears to be motivated by his speech-act conventionalism. Green and I agree however that 
the criterion by itself doesn’t provide any support for conventionalism, because the fact that 
something might be done with conventional means doesn’t make it conventional in any 
interesting sense. We also agree that speech-act conventionalism is wrong anyway, for cases 
such as assertions and promises – as opposed to declarations such as marrying or naming, and 
perhaps commands. Moreover, there are clear intuitive counterexamples to the performative 
delineation. As Sadock (2004, 56) points out, most theorists count threats as illocutionary 
acts, but they can hardly be done by means of the performative formula. Bribes make for a 
similar case. Depicting the way for you to come home by drawing a map is also intuitively an 
illocutionary act, which obviously cannot be done with the performative formula.8  
The reasons explaining why those acts cannot usually be made in that way are similar: an 
incompatibility between the goals of the acts and the resources that the performative formula 
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allows for carrying them out. Allowing for indirect assertions also requires us to reject the 
performative criterion. Threats and bribes can rarely be made explicit, because it is in their 
nature that they usually can work only by being hinted or insinuated. In the same vein, I want 
to allow for indirectly made speech acts, including assertions – i.e., for merely hinted or 
insinuated ones. Following Vendler (1976) in his apt objection to Strawson’s (1964) reliance 
on the performative criterion, I would say that it is not because they are not illocutionary acts 
that bribes or hinted assertions cannot be made with the performative formula; it is just 
because an attempt at doing them in such a way would be to commit “illocutionary suicide”. 
Searle (1979, ix) correctly takes hinting and insinuating to be just manners or styles in which 
illocutionary acts are made, which do not deprive them of their illocutionary character.  
Be this as it may, the appeal to the performative criterion or to speaker-meaning wouldn’t 
help to support the view that verbal fictions consist of mere acts of speech, because there 
wouldn’t be anything untoward in embedding the content of a fiction in the performative 
formula: I hereby invite you to imagine that …. Why then shouldn’t they be speech acts, as 
Currie and I think they are? This is not the place to try to characterize the nature of speech 
acts in general, assuming they have one. But there is something sufficiently theory-neutral we 
can observe about paradigm cases, such as assertions, requests, questions and promises, that 
may help us here. They involve speakers’ commitments vis-à-vis sufficiently determinate 
representational contents, whether or not these commitments are constitutive of the acts (as 
normative accounts have it) or just derivative from their non-normative nature, given norms 
with other sources, perhaps morality or rationality (as expressivist views say).9 Breaching 
these commitments usually leads to criticisms: what you told me is not true; I don’t see any 
reason to do what you ask me to; the question you are asking has no answer; I don’t see why I 
should have any interest in your doing what you promise me to do …  
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Now, there are corresponding things we say about fictions, and hence I take this to be a 
good intuitive reason to count them as communicative acts – speech acts of a specific 
category, not mere acts of speech –, cf. Grant (2001, 400), Sutrop (2002). We have an 
intuitive notion of the plot, story or content presented in a fiction. This is what, on Walton’s 
(1990) view, the fiction requires imagining for a competent engagement with it, if the 
question arises. This is also what Lewis (1978) tries to capture as truth in fiction, in his 
preferred possible worlds framework. Now, we criticize fictions relative to this notion, in 
ways that suggest a proprietary illocutionary force (vis-à-vis such propositional contents) of 
the kind that Currie (1990) and Stock (2017b) articulate in Walton-inspired Gricean terms – 
as proposals to imagine – whereas I (García-Carpintero 2013, 2016, 2019a, 2019b) have 
suggested they should be captured in normative terms. Thus, we complain that the plot is 
boring (to imagine), or implausible, or just impossible to make out – thereby upsetting, or 
simply blocking, the imaginative project of engaging with the relevant fiction.10  
We can thus raise a challenge to Green’s characterization of fictions as comprising mere 
“acts of speech”, or perhaps as putting forward contents for us to suppose. In a quotation 
above he defines them as “series of sentences whose contents are presented as to be 
imagined”, consistent with the view that they are just acts of speech. But we can now see that 
this is clearly inadequate. Nabokov’s Kinbote in Pale Fire is a textbook case of an unreliable 
narrator. When he tells us that a Zemblan assassin intending to kill Zembla’s deposed king 
(i.e., Kinbote himself) accidentally killed the poet Shade, we are not supposed to take this to 
be true in the fiction, part of the story we are presented to be imagined. We must infer instead 
that the killer is the insane Jack Grey, who wanted to kill the judge who put him away, 
mistaking Shade for him.11 The sentences comprising the fiction are there for us to entertain 
or suppose their contents, indeed; but this doesn’t mean that we are always required to 
imagine such contents, in the sense relevant for the proper appraisal of fictions on account of 
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their true nature. In many cases we are required to imagine instead other contents that we only 
arrive at through inferences, based in part on that of the sentences comprising the fiction. 
How are those inferences to be explained? The speech-act view of fiction-making offers 
clear-cut answers, based on general principles (García-Carpintero 2019b). For these 
inferences work essentially along the lines of speech-act indirection in general, on the 
assumption that the “accepted purpose or direction” of the conversation that Grice’s (1975, 
26) Cooperative Principle entreats us to take into account in general is in this particular case 
the one specific to fiction-making.12 I fail to see how cases like these – central to our 
understanding of fictions – can be accounted for on the assumption that fictions comprise just 
“acts of speech”, or suppositions. At the very least, they pose a serious challenge to that view. 
Assuming thus the speech-act view of fictions, I come back now to the question whether 
fiction-making itself should be considered an indirect speech act, when verbally done. Konrad 
(2017, 53-4) dismisses an indirect speech act account, with an argument that I take to be 
flawed. She considers only additive indirection, on the model of Grice’s “gas petrol” example, 
in which both the direct and the indirect act are actually performed. She argues on this basis 
that, when it comes to the fictional contribution of declarative utterances, the indirect-act view 
would thus entail that, implausibly, the “author’s commitment to the normal rules of the 
assertive speech act would still remain” (ibid.). However, as Grice himself noticed and has 
been repeatedly pointed out after him (cf. e.g., Vandeveken 1991, 375-6, Meibauer 2009), 
there are substitution implicatures in addition to additive ones, in which the literally indicated 
act is not actually made; irony or hyperbole are good examples of that. 
Nonetheless, I agree with Konrad that fiction-making is a direct speech act of its own, even 
when made by verbal means. I take it that this is the proper thing to say also about the case of 
declarations like naming, marrying or giving out players; there is no indirection going on in 
such cases. I take fiction-making to be typically done by the author pretending to do 
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something – or having other actors doing the pretending.13 The pretend actions might be non-
verbal, as in mime or ballet, or verbal; there is no significant difference in the two cases. 
Searle (1974-5) was right about this; he was only wrong in claiming that there is nothing more 
to fiction-making than pretense (cf. Currie 1990, 12-16).14 I thus also agree with Alward’s 
(2009) take on “onstage illocution”: it is just pretense.15 
 
 
4. Assertions in Fiction as Indirection 
 
I’ll finally move to assertions in fiction. As indicated at the outset, with Green, other 
writers (Friend 2014, Reicher 2012, Stock 2017a) and common sense I assume that fictions 
can make assertions, (1) and (2) being good examples for that. Now, on my own account the 
assertions in question are dependent on the primarily fiction-made content – via genre 
assumptions about fiction-made contents that are also put forward as providing knowledge by 
fiction-makers. Following Stock (2017a, 24, 29, 32) I take it that when Fowler wrote (2) she 
was not just fiction-making its content, although certainly she was doing that too – for the 
content put forward to be imagined by the full “utterance” constituting the novel is to be 
determined in part by the content of (2). I take it that she was also asserting it, providing her 
readers with correct information she had properly researched, and she was liable to being 
correctly criticized if the claim is false or merely accidentally true. And I suggest that she was 
asserting it in virtue of fiction-making it; i.e., that its role in the constitution of the fiction that 
she was producing is essential in explaining that she was also assertorically committing 
herself to it. This is on account of the type of fiction that hers is, and the sort of claims that 
authors like Fowler are understood to commit themselves to by producing such fictions. This 
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would hence be an indirect assertion; but one made by uttering a sentence whose literal 
content is precisely the asserted one.  
Standard accounts of implicatures and speech act indirection provide an adequate 
framework for how this works.16 The details can be developed along lines that others have 
already given. In his classical discussion of “truth in fiction”, Lewis (1978) envisaged two 
ways of learning from fiction. The first, applying to (1) and (2), he derives from the role 
played by an assumption that has come to be known (after Walton (1990)) as the Reality 
Principle – a principle roughly to the effect that we can take to be “true in the fiction” what is 
true simpliciter, to the extent that it is consistent with what is explicitly made part of the 
content of the fiction: “There may be an understanding between the author and his readers to 
the effect that what is true in his fiction, on general questions if not on particulars, is not to 
depart from what he takes to be the truth”.17 Along similar lines, Gendler (2000, 76) has 
explained how principles allowing the import of truths about the actual world to the content of 
fictions are a coin whose reverse side are corresponding export principles, allowing audiences 
in some cases (realist fiction genres, such as historical novels, biopics, etc.) to infer from 
fictional contents truths about the actual world.18  
This first mechanism accounting for how we can learn empirical truths from fictions 
implements standard accounts of indirection in a specific way: the genre-codified 
“understanding between the author and his readers” that Lewis posits can be seen as an 
invocation of the maxim of Relation, circumscribed to the specific conversations that 
engagements with fictions in the relevant genres are, and their specific illocutionary aims. The 
Gricean derivation I thus envisage goes along these lines: “The author of (2) invites me to 
imagine its content, committing herself to the imaginative project of which this is part being 
worth-indulging for readers like me. This is part of a fiction with serious ambitions, one of 
whose themes is animal rights. For such an imaginative project to be worth carrying out, 
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propositions like (2) stating the facts that frame the thematic moral issues that the author 
raises for readers to consider should be true. Hence, the author is also assertorically 
committing to (2).”19 
Unlike Green I thus take these cases to support Literary Cognitivism (LC) in the way he 
(2017a, 48) defines it: “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends 
crucially on its being fictional”. Green’s (2016, 286) reason against this is not that he 
understands LC to require that the knowledge in question could not be provided by non-
fictional means; he explicitly rejects this interpretation. His reason appears to be that the 
fictional settings in which (1) and (2) are embedded are not “crucial” to our acquiring the 
relevant pieces of factual knowledge. However, on the suggested account the assertions are in 
fact inferred given a maxim of relation specific to the relevant fiction-making genre: it is the 
positive evaluation of the imaginative projects proposed by the fictions as such, given the 
fundamental illocutionary category to which they belong, which requires that their settings are 
sufficiently realistic. I think it is reasonable to count this as “crucial” enough to the specific 
fictional character of those works for these cases to already validate LC. 
I agree with Green however that a second way by which we can learn propositions from 
fictions more clearly establishes LC. Lewis (1978, 278-9) also envisaged it:  
Fiction can offer us contingent truths about this world. It cannot take the place of 
non-fictional evidence, to be sure. But sometimes evidence is not lacking. We 
who have lived in the world for a while have plenty of evidence, but we may not 
have learned as much from it as we could have done. This evidence bears on a 
certain proposition. If only that proposition is formulated, straightway it will be 
apparent that we have very good evidence for it. If not, we will continue not to 
know it. Here, fiction can help us. If we are given a fiction such that the 
proposition is obviously true in it, we are led to ask: and is it also true simpliciter? 
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And sometimes, when we have plenty of unappreciated evidence, to ask the 
question is to know the answer. 
Gendler (2000, 76) calls this second inferential process “narrative as factory: I export 
things from the story whose truth becomes apparent as a result of thinking about the story 
itself. These I add to my stock the way I add knowledge gained by modeling”. Green (2010, 
2016, 2017a) has nicely developed a model which I take to be an elaboration of these ideas. 
On this model, we can acquire knowledge from fiction along the lines that we do when we 
make valid inferences based on suppositions.  
I have previously illustrated this with what appear to be thematic claims made in fictions 
about the very philosophical matter we have been discussing – the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge from fiction. Being professionally interested in the topic, we should expect 
fictions to convey views about it. And of course, there are many examples of this kind. The 
short story by Julio Cortázar, “A Continuity of Parks” is a good example. A claim we can take 
it to be putting for our consideration is modal: there might be fictions whose contents are 
entirely true. This would be a philosophical claim, contradicting some views on fiction (cp. 
Deutsch 2000, Stock 2017b).20 Drawing on recent work on the epistemology of modality, 
Stokes (2006) elaborates on how fictions support such modal claims.21 The basic idea is that 
they make situations conceivable; under certain assumptions, developed in different ways by 
different philosophers, this supports a claim that what is thus conceivable is thereby also 
possible. Lewis (1978, 278) also envisaged this: “Fiction might serve as a means for 
discovery of modal truth … Here the fiction serves the same purpose as an example in 
philosophy … the philosophical example is just a concise bit of fiction.” 
The two sorts of case I have discussed for assertions (and other assertoric acts) to be 
indirectly made in fictions are instances of indirection of the additive kind, typically inferred 
via derivations based on a Relation maxim specific to conversations whose aims are those 
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constitutive of fiction-making, and involving genre considerations. We can also think of 
examples of substitution indirection involving purported fictions. Consider, for instance, an 
obvious roman-à-clef “novel” which, being terribly boring, narratively pedestrian, lacking any 
interesting dialogue or ideas, and so on and so forth, falls manifestly short of fulfilling the 
specific goals of fictions; while, on the other hand, it contains interesting and reliable 
information, and its having been cunningly published as fiction can be easily explained – 
censorship in a dictatorial state, potential expensive lawsuits in a liberal one. In such a case, 





In this paper I have discussed two disagreements I have with Mitch Green’s work, if I 
understand it correctly: that fictions result from specific illocutionary acts; and that they make 
assertions and other constative acts through a process of speech act indirection. I have 
summed up reasons developed elsewhere that there are indirect, merely hinted or insinuated 
assertoric acts. I have also rehearsed a normative account of fiction-making as a specific type 
of illocutionary act. Finally, I have elaborated on such basis on a way to understand how 
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1 In a more recent paper, Green’s (2018a, §3) views appear to have evolved further, for he 
appears to allow that the implicature in Grice’s recommendation letter case is an assertion. 
This might perhaps in part be – I indulge myself to think –an effect of our having been 
debating these issues over the years. 
2 Bach (2006, 24) provides another example to the same effect, but it might be taken as a 
case of asserting both a content and another logically entailed by it. 
3 Pepp (forthcoming) makes similar points. 
4 Cf. Bach & Harnish (1979), 10-12. As it will transpire, Currie appears to mean by ‘literal’ 
what I do by ‘direct’. If so, as I explain below, in fact I agree with him that fiction-making is 
“literal”, thus understood, even when done with verbal means. 
5 Green would agree; cf. his (2018b) for a nice recent formulation.  
6 Walton (1990, 85-9) offers reasons against the specific speech-act view that Currie (1990, 
35-42) provides good replies to. Ohmann (1971), Grant (2001), Sutrop (2002), and Stock 
(2017b) also support the speech-act view; Gale (1971), Searle (1974/5), Alward (2009, 
2010a) and Friend (2012) object to it.  
7 Gale (1971, 335-7) says acts of fiction-making are “a special kind of illocutionary act”, 
but, like Searle, he takes this to consist in “illocutionary disengagement”, i.e., in the pretense 
that the ordinary speech acts indicated by the moods are performed, when in fact they are not. 
8 Green (2017b, 1595, fn) offers what is in fact a different delineation of speech acts, 
although I assume he takes it to be a mere variation on the official one: “I use ‘speech act’ to 
refer to an act that can be performed by speaker-meaning that one is doing so”. Although I 
don’t take speaker-meaning to be constitutive of meaning, neither in Grice’s nor Green’s 
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understanding, my objections to the performative definition don’t extend to this. For, as Camp 
(2018) points out, people who hint a bribe or a threat speaker-mean it. The same obviously 
applies to depiction. Green (2018b, 101-2) also offers the speaker-meaning definition; he 
counts threats as speech acts, not acts of speech. 
9 Green (1999, 2000) appeals to a general normative notion of commitment in his 
deservedly influential work on general features of different speech acts. 
10 Although he rejects the view for reasons I have questioned elsewhere (García-Carpintero 
2019b), Alward (2010a) provides a nice metaphor for the fiction-making speech acts from 
which I take fictions to result: they would be the deployment of “word-sculptures”.  
11 Cf. Wood (1998), 198. 
12 Green (1999, 2017b) elaborates on how the Cooperative Principle is just a general one, 
to be further specified relative to the specific conversational aims, record and acts comprising 
particular conversations. He (2017a, 54-5; 2017b, 1601-2) makes a good case for fictions as 
conversations (cf. Carroll 1992); Dixon & Bortolussi (2001) object to this, but Gerrig & 
Horton (2001) have a good rejoinder. The view of engagement with fictions as conversations 
also fits better with their being results of specific speech acts. 
13 What is to pretend? For our purposes, Nichols & Stich’s (2000, 128) suggestion will do: 
“To pretend that p is (at least to a rough first approximation) to behave in a way that is similar 
to the way one would (or might) behave if p were the case. Thus, a person who wants to 
pretend that p wants to behave more or less as he would if p were the case”. Langland-Hassan 
(2014) offers an elaborate account, with nice features that any proposal should incorporate. It 
is flawed by an assumption similar to the one I have questioned in Stock’s related account of 
the imagination (García-Carpintero 2019a), to wit, that any pretense has to be part of a project 
in carrying out which one disbelieves at least one of the propositions one pretends to act upon 
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14 Cp. Hoffman 2004, 519-20, which I don’t think succeeds in defending Searle’s argument 
by appeal to Searle’s “Principle of Expressibility” (see also Alward 2009, 324): as suggested 
above in the main text, the proposals or invitations that I take acts of fiction-making to be are, 
indeed, explicitly expressible, by means of the performative formula. My appeal to 
communicative pretense to explain how fictional content is conveyed also deals with 
Predelli’s (2019) uniformity abductive challenge to speech act theories of fictionality. 
15 Alward, however, argues that this tells against speech act theories of fiction-making like 
Currie’s or my own and in favor of pure pretense theories like Searle’s. His argument, 
however, is fallacious, as I have shown elsewhere (García-Carpintero 2019b). 
16 Cf. Bach & Harnish (1979, 64), Martinich (1980, 219-20), Vanderveken 1991, 376-380, 
and Green (1999, 2017b, 1598-9) for compelling ways, based on such standard accounts, to 
dispose of Alward’s (2010b, 356; 2009, 324-5) worry that an extension of Grice’s maxims to 
the act of fiction-making would be ad hoc; see Kania (2007, 406) for a similar response. 
17 Cf. Friend (2017) for discussion and an alternative, which she calls Reality Assumption: 
everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. 
18 Abell (2014, 32) offers an account of genres I find congenial. Genre membership is on 
her view a function of (common knowledge of) the purposes defining a given category (the 
historical novel, say) plus the producer’s intention that the work performs those purposes. 
19 This just articulates as a case of indirection Stock’s (2017a, 29, 31-2) take on (2). 
20 As Wilson (1986, ch. 4) convincingly argues, Hitchcock’s North by Northwest is another 
interesting case, showing how someone (witnessed by the Cary Grant character Thornhill) can 
improve morally by imagining himself in the shoes of a fictional character. Vertigo might be 
seen as showing the opposite, the moral dangers of engagement with fictions – how a certain 
sort of male can prefer romantic relationships with fictional characters than real women. 
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21 Cf. also Ichikawa & Jarvis (2009) and Elgin (2014) on assimilating fictions on this score 
to thought-experiments. 
